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Definition
The definition of population isolation is removing inhabitants of one area from their homes, and resettling them into another civilian center where they might be cared for by a security force that is attempting to safeguard the population from external threats. The security force is responsible for providing for the population in a controlled setting that does not aid the opposing force. Another key component is the removal of the ability for civilians to live outside of the concentration zones, as those areas may resemble a wasteland. The destruction or absence of crops, shelter, and necessary survival components occur during the process of concentration.
There are many terms that relate to the above definition, and are used liberally in describing population isolation through numerous textbooks and scholarly works. These terms include: concentration, protected zones, concentration camps, zones of protection, colonies, concentration policy, reconcentrado policy, guarded zones, reconcentration camps, forceful measures of pacification, resettlement, protected camps, and concentration zones.
5 Some of these terms carry emotional weight. For instance, the term concentration camps can be closely associated with Nazi death camps. Concentration camps conjure a severely negative image, which betray the intentions of most techniques of population isolation that focuses on relocation due to unsafe conditions. An understanding of the definition will prevent pre-conceived views as to the intended purpose of population isolation. 
Literature Review
Some textbooks which explain the Philippine War indicate that population isolation was a common practice. 6 Impressions gained from these works convince that this tactic was a first option. These works do a great disservice to the scope and usage of the concentration of civilians during the Philippine War. This case study will illustrate the magnitude of this harsh pacification practice, along with the decisions by military leaders that treated population isolation as an extreme, not routine, measure.
Operational leaders in the US Army, like Bell and Robert L. Bullard, wrote about zones of protection during the war. 7 Their original words are useful in attaining insight of their actions, but limited when discussed today. The few documents written on population isolation in the early 1900s corresponded with the Senate hearings on atrocities committed by the US military in the Philippine War. 8 These hearings, held right after the conflict was over in 1902, curtailed professional literature by military officers. Concluding the Senate hearings, the nation wanted to provide distance from this war, with less controversy. 9 The US Army seemed focused on large unit operations, unlike the recently conducted counter-insurgency in the Philippines. Philippines, 1901 -1902 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007 ). Bullard's article is in his own words, while Ramsey's work consolidates Bell's directives (circulars).
Participants in the Philippine War discussed population isolation and its effect on the Filipino people. These reports garnered much attention during the ongoing conflict. This perspective, viewed through the lens of anti-war politicians and participants, fed the opposition against the expansionist aims of the United States. Anti-war individuals had political reasons for opposing the policies of isolation.
11
Personal descriptions of those that witnessed the zones of protection focus on individual soldiers and marines. These combatants witnessed population isolation with varying views of its success and failure. The Anti-Imperialist League encouraged the publication of letters from soldiers who claimed to set houses on fire and shoot civilians. 12 Viewed by the native Filipino population, concentration camps appear as unnecessary and extremely harsh punishment. In one example of many, extreme charges of hostage taking, rape, and torture from the Filipinos in Candelaria warranted an Army investigation.
13
Secondary sources address environmental effects of population isolation. Orders to destroy livestock, and the lack of ranchers available, effected the natural environment. The decrease of the carabao cattle herd population changed the predicted environment of the 11 Glenn May, Battle for Batangas: A Philippine province at War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 280-281. A Philadelphia Ledger article and other papers likened Bell to "Butcher" Weyler in Cuba. On January 1902 Bell caught negative press. Written reports were furnished to the senate committee hearings from MAJ Cornelius Gardener, who was the provincial governor of Tayabas. He accused the military establishment of atrocious behavior, unnecessary property destruction, and the use of the water cure. Another written report from Florencio Caedo, a provincial secretary of Batangas, charged that the US occupation aided in the population decrease, with an overall death of 100,000 inhabitants. Pacific, 1902 -1940 The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), Linn, Philippine War and Linn, Army and Counterinsurgency. These major works of Linn discuss the Philippine War in full or partial detail, and all three discuss population isolation.
A clear and concise case study of population isolation during the Philippine War, through the lens of a current military view, does not exist. This monograph is an attempt to add to the body of literature on this conflict by analyzing population isolation in the Philippine War, and the positive and negative results of such actions.
What is certain is that employment of population isolation was a tactic that helped achieve the political and military objectives of winning the war. The original tactic of attraction used in 1899 and 1900 failed to yield widespread results, as the US Army could not overcome the shadow government that predated the arrival of the Americans, attained legitimacy during the decline of the Spanish in the Philippines, and continued to exist during the Philippine War. 25 The measures of concentration involved in pacification led to the general ending of resistance against the US Army in the Philippines. These harsh pacification measures were dependent on various regional events and represented a sizable scope of the overall operational area of the Philippine
Islands that the US military attempted to control during the war. This study's focus is to examine how widespread the practice of population isolation was during the Philippine War. First is an explanation of general stages that escalated the regions of the war from conventional to guerilla warfare. This eventually led to the use of population isolation. Then will be a brief analysis of the history of the use of concentration, including how a portion of the Filipino forces used population isolation. An examination of most areas of concentration in the Philippines involves an analysis of various areas of Luzon, followed by techniques employed on the islands near and on Samar, and Marinduque. This study's conclusion will assess the overall impact of population isolation, and note the lack of details available for a clear understanding of the complete situation. Birtle, Counterinsurgency 1860 -1941 . The Filipino leaders hoped to harass US forces and encourage the Anti-Imperialists. They were aware of the elections of 1900, and with continued pressure, the insurrectos' strategy was to influence the election towards William Jennings Bryan. 30 Mixed in with a liberal policy of pardon, frequent general amnesty calls, and other incentives, this variety of challenges was too much for the weakened guerrilla groups to 33 Arnold, Jungle of Snakes, 24. "During 1900 the Americans recorded 350 known assassinations and 442 assaults. The actual numbers were doubtless much higher." 34 Linn, Philippine War, 237, [267] [268] . 35 Ibid., 131. 36 Ibid., 220. 37 Ibid., 214.
overcome. In addition, some areas actually asked the US military for protection. Civilians were willing to move into protected zones to stay away from the insurrectos.
38 Concurrent with calls for general amnesty, improvement in infrastructure measures were undertaken. Building schools, improving roads, and making port facilities functional helped to win over the local elites and populations in some areas of the Philippines.
39
In a few locations in the Philippines, after months or years of conflict, the war had generally run its course along the previously mentioned lines of conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, attraction policies, and brutality to civilians from all combatants. An outlier to all of these patterns was the Muslim dominated Moro region. 40 When the shadow governments were not fully co-opted, and where the elite support for resistance against the US forces were the strongest, then harsher measures of pacification were often undertaken against the Filipino Jungle, 1902 -1913 (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011 . Many descriptions exist in what can be defined as a separate conflict, and this work, along with others, will easily capture the differences in these conflicts, with the one continuity that the US forces were the combatants of one side. Where this pattern did not play out was in the Moro inhabited area of the Southern Philippines, including Mindanao and Moro influenced surrounding islands. The conflicts between US forces and the inhabitants will not be discussed in this monograph. Warfare here was fought differently, mainly attributed to cultural influences and the vastly contrasting approaches taken by the US forces in subduing the Moro uprisings that sporadically occurred in the early 1900s during the American occupation of the Philippines. Although there were instances of food deprivation, blockades, and combat patrols, there did not seem to be examples of population isolation, as termed in this monograph, present in the conflicts with the Moros. The majority of Lieber's Code deals with fair and humane treatment of civilians and combatants, and was translated and used extensively in Europe. 43 The On the island of Leyte, less than two miles removed from Samar, the insurrectos practiced population isolation. In 1900 there was a localized civil war raging in towns on Leyte as
Filipino police forces fought against the insurrectos. Conflicts raged because the insurrectos attempted to burn the villages to prevent US force basing operations, and local inhabitants resisted the destruction of their property. The insurrectos attempted to encourage the regional population to desert the towns to deprive the Americans of any attempt of civilian governance.
US forces used coercion and conciliation to attempt to bring the Filipinos back into the villages, while the insurrectos forced most of the town "into the hills to grow crops." 62 The leader of this insurrecto movement was Ambrosio Moxica (another Aguinaldo supporter). 63 He issued decrees that restricted Filipinos from living in occupied zones. 64 60 Linn, Army and Counterinsurgency, 95-118 described the complex process that Belarmino faced in concentrating his own population in an attempt to deprive the US invaders of their ability to control the local area. 61 Ibid., 108-109. A discussion of techniques to bring the population back into the American controlled sectors show that lack of substance coupled with religious support and native appeals by secure citizens succeeded in drawing away from Belarmino's popular support. Luzon, as the major island with the capital city, highest population, and most of the land mass of the Philippines, had a minority of its geographical area exposed to population isolation techniques. Specifically population concentration occurred in four different geographical locales.
Both belligerent parties played a role in these four areas, which included the Ilocos region (1901), the Batangas area (1901) (1902) , the Bicolondia peninsula (by the insurrectos, 1900), and central Luzon (1904 Luzon ( -1906 for over a year. Casualties mounted towards the end of 1900 as the Americans suffered some regression in their attempts at pacification. Fortunately for the Americans, US forces were able to take advantage of an intelligence windfall. 71 This increased knowledge led to a system of using one religious group against the existing resistance organization, with ample success. However, the shadow government persisted due to the ties with the elites that the resistors had, and this led to the employment of population isolation practices in the Abra region. 72 The insurrectos in Abra were entrenched well compared to the rest of the department. The duration of these concentration areas was less than three weeks, and limited to a small region of the overall department of Northern Luzon. Insurrecto resistance quickly crumbled, and the resistors came to terms with the Americans as their popular and material support rapidly diminished due to sustenance deprivation.
In early 1901, after the Abra conflict and concentration measures had already started, Ramsey, Counterguerrilla Warfare, [55] [56] [57] [58] [62] [63] . Circulars seven, ten, and seventeen are good accounts of many examples of attempting to relieve civilian suffering through ration control. In 1900, the large island of Samar was facing food shortages due to drought, war between the Americans and the insurrectos, and a US Naval blockade. The main export from Samar was hemp, and in early 1900, US forces attempted to secure ports and encourage the population to accept American goals and resume trade. 89 Pacification efforts did not significantly convince the population of nearly three hundred thousand Samarenos to abandon their insurrecto leaders.
There was some tactical success of US forces in attracting the regional population to their cause of pacification. Local populations did accept the US forces, and a few local Samareno police forces formed to assist in pacification efforts. 90 Upon their completion of recruitment, these police forces transferred to Leyte.
The insurrectos continued to be a strong force throughout all of 1900. While facing food shortages, the resistors attempted to establish farms and supply caches in the rough jungle interior. They targeted US patrols when they could, and after a few costly encounters of attempts at conventional warfare, the insurrectos changed their tactics. Using guerrilla warfare, they attempted to harass and kill Americans on their terms using the terrain, deception, and massive On the neighboring island of Leyte, the population of 270,000 faced five US infantry companies in 1900. The US Commander on Leyte drove to destroy the insurrectos, and his ambitious plan led to 125 engagements in five months. 92 He was able to convince his commander 90 Donald Chaput, "Founding of the Leyte Scouts" Leyte-Samar Studies 9, no. 2, (September 1975): 5-6, 8-9. to draw US troops and Samareno police forces away from Samar to aid in pacifying Leyte.
Several one-sided battles occurred in which the US forces severely damaged the insurrecto infrastructure on Leyte. In addition, efforts to open schools, hold elections, and provide other social services paid huge dividends. In areas that wanted US forces, a pre-condition was for the clearing of insurrectos by the local population. Local disagreement between the insurrectos and villagers would sometimes incite Filipino conflict, and the US military established pro-American police forces throughout the island, in return for US economic support and protection from the insurrectos. The formation of the pro-American Leyte scouts helped increase US strength on Leyte.
93
Some civilians endured two resettlement periods on Leyte. In order to avoid American influence, the insurrectos convinced the civilians to leave the villages and towns and establish farms in the interior. Eventually segments of the population faced starvation due to poor conditions in the interior. As food became scarce, the Americans enticed the civilians back into protected zones while continuing to bring the fight to the insurrecto bases on Leyte. Locals fell under American led civilian administration, and resistance continued to weaken through the end of 1900. These areas of concentration were not severe in death tolls towards civilians, as local rule against the insurrectos largely seemed to avoid massive civil deprivation and discord.
Insurrectos continued to surrender in growing amounts through the end of 1900, and by May 1901 the key insurrecto leader on Leyte surrendered.
94
While dealing with food shortage continued, the conditions on Samar worsened in
1901.
95 In May 1901, Major General Arthur MacArthur was the commander of all land forces in the Philippines. Pacification was working throughout most of the archipelago, and it was time for 93 Chaput, "Leyte Scouts," 6, 8-9. 94 Linn, Philippine War, 237-240. 98 What changed the guerrilla warfare success of the insurrectos was the Balangiga 96 Linn, Philippine War, 309. 97 Ibid., 234.
98 Kenneth Young, "Guerrilla Warfare: Balangiga Revisted" Leyte-Samar Studies 11, no. 1. (February 1977) : 21-28. Young's article is one of many works that touch upon atrocities on all sides during the Philippine War, and his conclusion on page 28 summarizes Samar and all of the Philippines and the violent and unlawful interaction of belligerents during Guerilla warfare against each other and against civilians. 131 Birtle, "Marinduque," 271. 132 Bruno, "Insurgency on Samar," 34. 133 Birtle, "Marinduque," 275. 134 Ibid., 280.
of population isolation in full effect. 135 He approved of this measure, and the policy of concentration was re-enforced in his mind as a worthy tool for population control.
136
The results of population concentration on Marinduque are difficult to measure today.
Recorded were significant livestock losses and the agricultural change of the island, resulting in
Marinduque becoming a rice importer compared to the previous year of exporting rice as a cash crop. Deaths are not prevalent on record in the protection zones, but several thousand deaths to the inhabitants occurred during 1901 to 1903 due to disease. As elsewhere, the carabao population was massively devastated due to rinderpest in 1902. Like the actions on Luzon and Samar, it is hard to draw a direct correlation to population concentration and direct devastation in the postbellum years, but the similarities of the situation seem to indicate that stresses on the environment and people by concentration methods led to an additional source of devastation to the island of Marinduque. 
